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WINDING TOWARD THE HEART OF THE




People care about property.  In 2005, the United States Supreme
Court decided two cases with deep connections to that concern,
both brought by property owners challenging the government’s
power under the Takings Clause1 to take title to, or significantly
affect the value of, their property.  In both cases, the Court re-
jected the property owners’ claims and upheld the government’s
action against charges that it had overreached.  In both cases, the
Court found the issue to be relatively simple, legally speaking.
One of these cases, Kelo v. City of New London,2 has been seen as
controversial from the moment it was decided,3 and remains con-
troversial today.4  The other case, Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc.,5
* Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Research, Temple University Beas-
ley School of Law.  Thanks to the editors of  the Fordham Urban Law Journal for
inviting me to contribute to this issue.  Thanks also to Craig Green, Richard Green-
stein, and Carol Rose who provided enormously useful comments on earlier drafts.
Finally, thanks to Shira Helstrom for excellent research assistance.  All errors are
mine.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
2. 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
3. Peter S. Canellos, High Court Backs Seizure of Land for Development, BOS-
TON GLOBE, June 24, 2005, at A1; Linda Greenhouse, Justices Uphold Taking Prop-
erty for Development, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 2005, at A1; Stephen Henderson, Property
Seizure Widened: The U.S. Supreme Court’s Ruling Lets Governments Take Private
Property for Private Use, but with a Public Benefit, PHILA. INQUIRER, June 24, 2005, at
A01; David G. Savage, Justices Back Forced Sale of Property: Cities Have the Author-
ity to Clear Land for Redevelopment Even Where Blight is Not an Issue, the Supreme
Court Rules in a 5-4 Vote, L.A. TIMES, June 24, 2005, at A1.
4. Sometimes, a title says it all. See Gideon Kanner, Kelo v. New London: Bad
Law, Bad Policy, and Bad Judgment, 38 URB. LAW. 201, 233 (2006) (“Kelo was a case
of active judicial expansion of preexisting policy-driven eminent domain decisions
that tampered with the meaning of words to reach an unjust result preferred by the
Court’s majority.  In doing so the majority surrendered the vital function of constitu-
tional review to an unaccountable, self-serving business-government alliance.”); see
also Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Uselessness of Public Use, 106
COLUM. L. REV. 1412 (2006) (describing attacks on Kelo by libertarians, liberals, and
communitarians).
5. 544 U.S. 528 (2005).
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has received far less public attention, despite the fact that its hold-
ing, unlike Kelo’s,6 established new law in the takings area.7
It might be thought that Kelo’s relatively greater impression in
the public mind is traceable to its sympathetic facts.  The case was,
after all, brought by long-term residents who stood to lose their
homes if the economic redevelopment project at issue were permit-
ted to go forward.8 Lingle, in contrast, dealt with the constitution-
ality of a Hawaii ordinance limiting the rents oil companies could
charge to lessee-dealers.9  No sympathetic displaced homeowners
here.  The technical issues in each case were also different in a way
that might account for Kelo’s stronger impact on the public con-
sciousness. Kelo involved a direct and overt exercise of the state’s
eminent domain power to take private property, whereas Lingle
was a “regulatory takings” case, alleging that what appeared to be
a garden-variety economic regulation in fact constituted a taking of
property.10 Kelo’s outcome can easily be spun as a tale of tragic
victimization of innocent homeowners by a voracious government
captured by powerful corporate interests.  It is hard to find much
melodrama in a rent cap.
While these differences are by no means trivial, this Article ar-
gues that the significance of Kelo and of Lingle lies elsewhere—in
the extent to which the two cases engage with, or fail to engage
with, the cultural debate over the function of property in contem-
porary society.  As is developed in Part I, the facts of Kelo did in-
deed raise emotionally and politically charged issues with which
the public was strongly engaged.  Notwithstanding its controversial
political implications, however, Kelo turned out to be a fairly easy
legal case from a technical standpoint.  As least as the majority saw
it, two hundred years of case law,11 including two particularly note-
6. For articles explaining the view that Kelo broke no new ground with respect to
“public use,” see infra note 88.
7. Specifically, Lingle established that takings and due process analyses are dis-
tinct and subject to different standards. See infra notes 144-52 and accompanying
text.
8. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 475 (2005) (“Petitioner Susette
Kelo has lived in the Fort Trumbull area since 1997.  She has made extensive improve-
ments to her house, which she prizes for its water view.  Petitioner Wilhelmina Dery
was born in her Fort Trumbull house in 1918 and has lived there her entire life.”).
9. See 544 U.S. at 533.
10. Id. at 542-45.
11. The Court specifically referred to nineteenth century state court decisions in-
volving Mill Acts and mining, which rejected “use by the public” as a test for “public
use.” Kelo, 545 U.S. at 479 n.8.  Justice Thomas, in dissent, reads these cases differ-
ently. See id. at 512-17 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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worthy decisions from the mid- and late-twentieth century,12 estab-
lished law unfavorable to the plaintiffs’ claims.13  In terms of “the
ongoing conventions of constitutional adjudication,”14 in particular
fidelity to precedent, Kelo was legally uncomplicated.
Because the majority saw the result as virtually dictated by prior
precedent, it wrote an opinion that seems insensitive to the issues
the public was, and still is, debating.15  Many people—including
prominent academics16—understand property “as a bulwark which
protects material wealth, liberty, and autonomy; for the govern-
ment to impair this bulwark—without recognizing that impair-
ment—touches, on the deepest levels, the feelings of security of
ordinary citizens.”17  Although Kelo’s facts raised precisely this
concern over governmental power and individual liberty, the
Court’s opinion, which focused mainly on precedent, did not seri-
ously address the fear that government might threaten citizens’ se-
curity or confidence in the protection of their rights.18  If, as one
influential constitutional scholar has asserted, legal authority is not
merely a matter of “the logical manipulation of received rules,” but
instead must be conceived “as a living connection between the
Court and the nation, the result of a certain relationship of trust
that the Court works to establish with the American public,”19
then the Court violated the conditions necessary to create that
trust.  Such trust requires, “at a minimum,” that the public be con-
fident “that the Court will justly balance its obligation to maintain
fidelity to rule-of-law virtues against its obligation to align its judg-
12. Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S.
26 (1954).
13. See infra text accompanying notes 52-87.
14. Robert C. Post, Foreword: Fashioning the Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts,
and Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 4, 108 (2003) (exploring the ways in which constitutional
law is and is not independent from the beliefs and values of nonjudicial actors).
15. See Thomas J. Lueck, Suit Against Atlantic Yards Challenges Eminent Domain,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 2006, at B4 (observing that opponents of Brooklyn redevelop-
ment project argue the state is abusing eminent domain by “taking one citizen’s prop-
erty to benefit a powerful and influential private citizen”).
16. See generally RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE
POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN (Harv. Univ. Press 1985).
17. LAURA S. UNDERKUFFLER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY: ITS MEANING AND
POWER 1-2 (Oxford Univ. Press 2003).
18. The Court did note, however, that “it has long been accepted that the sover-
eign may not take the property of A for the sole purpose of transferring it to another
private party B, even though A is paid just compensation.”  Kelo v. City of New
London, 545 U.S. 469, 477 (2005).  Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion focused di-
rectly on this theme, carefully scrutinizing the facts to see whether there were signs of
“impermissible favoritism.” Id. at 491 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
19. Post, supra note 14, at 109.
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ments with constitutional culture.”20  By attending almost entirely
to prior law on the public use question, and failing to address the
public’s beliefs and values, including its beliefs and values about
the Takings Clause,21 the Court evaded involvement in what is now
an ongoing public dialogue about property and government.  For
this, it will not be soon forgiven.22
Part II argues that the Court was far more effective in Lingle
than it was in Kelo in engaging directly with public unease about
the relationship between government and private property.  As in
Kelo, the legal issue in Lingle was relatively uncomplicated.  In
evaluating the validity of the alleged taking, the test from Agins v.
City of Tiburon23 dictated that the Court merely had to consider
whether the regulation in question did or did not “substantially ad-
vance legitimate state interests.”24  As in Kelo, the Court’s view of
its precedents was decisive; the Agins language, the Court found,
“was derived from due process, not takings, precedents.”25  In the
Court’s eyes, it was as easy in Lingle to see how the due process
cases were distinguishable as it had been in Kelo to see how the
prior public use cases were determinative.
But the Court in Lingle did not confine itself to precedent.  It
went on to differentiate due process anaylsis from takings analysis,
an approach which provided the Court the opportunity to explain
the kind of injury that, in its view, is distinctively cognizable under
the Takings Clause—injury involving a burden of a particular
“magnitude or character” that is not properly “distributed among
property owners.”26  In some ways, this holding broke no new
ground.  In words that have often been repeated, the Court as-
serted a half-century ago in Armstrong v. United States that the
Takings Clause “was designed to bar Government from forcing
20. Id.
21. Post refers to the first set of beliefs and values, i.e., those that do not pertain
specifically to law, as “culture,” and the second set, i.e., those that “encompass . . .
extrajudicial beliefs about the substance of the Constitution” as “constitutional cul-
ture.” Id. at 8.
22. This is true in a literal as well as figurative sense.  In a gesture of anger, the
town of Weare, New Hampshire sought to condemn the home of Justice Souter, who
joined the majority in Kelo. See Kathy McCormack, Battle Over Ruling Comes
Knocking at Justice’s Door, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 22, 2006, at 19; Elizabeth Mehren, A
Door-to-Door Bid to Single Out Justice, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2006, at A15.  This effort
was successfully rebuffed. See Justice Prevails in Eviction Bid, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 5,
2006, at 8.
23. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
24. Id. at 260.
25. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 540 (2005).
26. Id. at 542.
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some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and
justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.”27  The growth of
“property rights movements”28 and the passage of ordinances, such
as Oregon’s Measure 37,29 which seek to compel government to
compensate owners for the economic losses imposed by regulatory
actions, demonstrate that people care deeply about the question of
the distribution of regulatory burdens.  This concern is well-war-
ranted, for “[u]nderstanding constitutional limitations on the
power of the government to regulate private commercial behavior,
especially where those regulations frustrate an economic opportu-
nity related to real property, is central to mapping the relationship
between the individual, state, and society.”30 By openly returning
takings jurisprudence to its Armstrong heart in “fairness and jus-
tice,” without attempting to set forth a definitive “test” for deter-
mining what is fair and just, the Court left open the possibility of a
conversation between it and the public—including “property
27. 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).  The Armstrong language in turn was derived from
Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States. 148 U.S. 312, 325 (1893) (“[The Fifth
Amendment] prevents the public from loading upon one individual more than his just
share of the burdens of government, and says that when he surrenders to the public
something more and different from that which is exacted from other members of the
public, a full and just equivalent shall be returned to him.”).
28. See William Yardley, Anger Drives Property Rights Measures, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 8, 2006, at A34; see generally Richard J. Lazarus, The Measure of a Justice: Justice
Scalia and the Faltering of the Property Rights Movement Within the Supreme Court,
57 HASTINGS L.J. 759 (2006) (describing the successes and failures of the property
rights movement within the Supreme Court); Carol M. Rose, A Dozen Propositions
on Private Property, Public Rights, and the New Takings Legislation, 53 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 265 (1996) (describing and discussing legislation proposed by property rights
advocates); Gerald Torres, Taking and Giving: Police Power, Public Value, and Private
Right, 26 ENVTL. L. 1, 2 (1996) [hereinafter Torres, Taking and Giving] (describing the
“political technique” of property rights advocates).
29. OR. REV. STAT. § 197.352 (2007). Section 1 of this statute provides:
If a public entity enacts or enforces a new land use regulation or enforces a
land use regulation enacted prior to December 2, 2004, that restricts the use
of private real property or any interest therein and has the effect of reducing
the fair market value of the property, or any interest therein, then the owner
of the property shall be paid just compensation.
Id. § 197.352(1).  With respect to the origins, operation, and policy implications of
Measure 37, see Margaret H. Clune, Government Hardly Could Go On: Oregon’s
Measure 37, Implications for Land Use Planning and a More Rational Means of Com-
pensation, 38 URB. LAW. 275 (2006); Sara C. Galvan, Gone Too Far: Oregon’s Measure
37 and the Perils of Over-Regulating Land Use, 23 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 587 (2005);
Edward J. Sullivan, Year Zero: The Aftermath of Measure 37, 38 URB. LAW. 237
(2006).
30. Torres, Taking and Giving, supra note 28, at 4 (asserting that the property
rights debate is often transformed into a story of patriotic struggle and therefore trig-
gers heightened public interest).
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rights” advocates—about what the Takings Clause will mean in the
future.  Since the public cares about property, this is an important
conversation to enable.
Part III describes the implications of Kelo and Lingle for future
redevelopment projects.  Here, I acknowledge that my conclusions
are quite tentative.  We know now a lot more than we did before
about what will be regarded as a “public use” as a matter of federal
constitutional law.  But since Kelo can easily be overridden by state
or federal legislation—legislation that the majority expressly in-
vited and that states have rushed to pass31—it is not clear how
much relevance Kelo will have in future eminent domain cases.  On
the regulatory takings side, we know now more than we did before
what is not part of the analysis; the Court in Lingle successfully
disentangled due process from takings claims.  We also know now,
generically as it were, the kinds of concerns the Court thinks are
properly addressed in regulatory takings claims.32  How the general
concepts articulated in Lingle will be implemented in the future—
what particulars will truly count—is, alas, another question alto-
gether.  From a doctrinal point of view, it is not clear how much
guidance the two opinions will provide to municipal planners in
assessing whether proposed land use regulations will survive judi-
cial scrutiny under the Fifth Amendment.
The real significance of the opinions may relate to the issue of
public trust and the constitutional culture of property rights.  In
upholding broad exercises of the eminent domain power, Kelo may
have rather paradoxically made it more difficult for state and local
governments to exercise that power, because it only heightened
distrust of municipal actions affecting property.  This heightened
distrust may well extend beyond eminent domain to less obvious
exercises of municipal power—such as new regulatory regimes or
innovative taxing schemes.  Thus, despite the Court’s endorsement
of broad exercises of municipal power, Kelo may have rendered it
harder, rather than easier, for local governments to exercise con-
trol over local land development.
31. For a summary of post-Kelo legislation, see The National Conference of State
Legislatures Homepage, http://www.ncsl.org (search “Post-Kelo”; then follow “Post
Kelo v. New London State Eminent Domain Legislation” hyperlink) (last visited Jan.
22, 2007).
32. Specifically, questions of the “magnitude” and the “distribution” of the bur-
dens of regulation.  For a discussion of the potential indeterminacy of these terms, see
infra text accompanying notes 183-84, 207-09.  On the importance of burden distribu-
tion in the related context of exactions, see Carlos A. Ball & Laurie Reynolds, Exac-
tions and Burden Distribution in Takings Law, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1513 (2006).
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I. KELO:  POSSIBILITIES UNREALIZED
The facts of Kelo are relatively well-known.33  The case arose out
of efforts to revitalize the Fort Trumbull area of the city of New
London (the “City”), itself a “distressed municipality.”34  The City
sought to leverage the decision of Pfizer Inc., a pharmaceutical
company, to build a research facility nearby;35 the New London
Development Corporation created an ambitious plan for parks,
public walkways, office and retail space, and residences.36  This
plan, it was hoped, would create jobs, increase tax revenues, and
rejuvenate downtown New London.37
Approved in January 2000, the plan authorized the City to
purchase property or acquire property by eminent domain.38  It ex-
ercised this power with respect to Susette Kelo and several other
long-term Fort Trumbull residents after negotiations to purchase
their properties failed.39  In response, Kelo and the other residents
brought suit in state court alleging that the “taking” of their
properties, which were not blighted, violated the “public use” re-
striction in the Fifth Amendment.40  After the Connecticut courts
denied their claim,41 the United States Supreme Court granted cer-
tiorari “to determine whether a city’s decision to take property for
the purpose of economic development satisfies the ‘public use’ re-
quirement of the Fifth Amendment.”42  By a vote of five to four,
the Court answered that question in the affirmative.43
The Kelo case clearly and accessibly raised the question whether
citizen owners should regard the state as friend or foe, protector or
thief, ally or enemy, with respect to property.  Can a government
body which exercises its eminent domain power to take homes to
which individuals have held title for decades be trusted to further
the public good, or is it to be feared for its potential to trample
individuals’ rights in pursuit of its own agendas or, worse yet, the
agendas of different, favored, citizens?  The Court’s holding—that
the use of eminent domain to promote economic development sat-
33. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 472-76 (2005).
34. Id. at 473.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 474.
37. Id. at 472-73.
38. Id. at  475.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. See Kelo v. City of New London, 843 A.2d 500, 508 (Conn. 2004).
42. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 477.
43. Id. at 490.
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isfies the Takings Clause’s “public use” requirement, even where
the municipal action in question involves the transfer of title from
one private owner to another—hardly provides an intuitive answer
to these questions; where is the “public” use in a private-entity-to-
private-entity transfer?  There is, moreover, an enormous gap be-
tween, on the one hand, the calm, deliberate tone of the opinion,
and, on the other hand, the public’s passionate concern for the is-
sues the case seemed to raise.44  That gap—reflecting the Court’s
view that existing law more or less dictated a result favoring the
government—is, I will argue, extremely problematic insofar as it
suggested, even if unintentionally, that the Court did not feel any
institutional obligation to address the public’s fear that New
London’s victory renders all property rights vulnerable.
Part A of this section examines Kelo doctrinally, focusing on the
decision’s relation to prior precedents.  I neither support nor de-
fend the majority’s account of the Court’s history of its reading of
“public use.”45  My purpose is only to demonstrate how the Court’s
understanding of prior law rendered Kelo relatively easy to decide,
from a technical perspective.  Part B considers the Court’s invita-
tion to states to define for themselves the scope of local eminent
domain power.  This invitation, I argue, is best understood in terms
of the Court’s sense of the constraints imposed by the prior case
law.  It may have been heard, however, in quite a different way
than the Court intended—as a message of indifference to public
fear.  Part C takes up the public outcry that followed Kelo, and
considers the possibilities left unrealized by the Kelo decision.
44. See Megan Barnett, A Homeowner’s Battle, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Feb.
28, 2005, at 48; Kirstin Downey, Fighting the Power to Take Your Home, WASH. POST,
May 7, 2005, at F1; Stephen Henderson, Private Land vs. Public Control, PHILA. IN-
QUIRER, Feb. 23, 2005, at A1; Matt Hudgins, When is Eminent Domain Eminently
Unfair?, NAT’L REAL EST. INVESTOR, May 2005, at 14-15; Charles Lane, Justices Af-
firm Property Seizures, WASH. POST, June 24, 2005, at A1; Elizabeth Mehren, Dis-
patch from New London, Conn., L.A. TIMES, May 29, 2005, at A20; Iver Peterson, As
Land Goes to Revitalization, There Go the Old Neighbors, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2005,
at 29; Timothy Sandefur, Eminent Domain Abuse, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2005, at B4;
David G. Savage, Justices Back Forced Sale of Property, L.A. TIMES, June, 24 2005, at
A1; David G. Savage, Cases Lift Hopes for Property Rights, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 22,
2005, at A9; Your Home is Your Castle—Until the City Says It Isn’t, USA TODAY, Feb.
22, 2005, at 11A.
45. As is developed infra in the text accompanying notes 111-16, Justice O’Connor
believed that the majority misread the earlier cases, which were, in her view, distin-
guishable. See 545 U.S. at 497-502 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).  Justice Thomas, also
dissenting, seemed to agree with the majority about the meaning of the prior case law,
but in his view, “[o]ur cases have strayed from the [Takings] Clause’s original mean-
ing,” and for that reason the Court should have reconsidered them.  545 U.S. at 506
(Thomas, J., dissenting).
\\server05\productn\F\FUJ\34-2\FUJ202.txt unknown Seq: 9 31-MAY-07 9:25
2007] KELO AND LINGLE 621
Like the public use cases that preceded it, Kelo represented an op-
portunity to consider and discuss the state’s role as a guardian of
private property rights,46 and how takings complicate and
problematize that role.47  Because the “fundamental constitutional
beliefs of the American people are informed and sustained by the
constitutional law announced by courts, just as that law is informed
and sustained by the fundamental constitutional beliefs of Ameri-
cans,”48 the Court’s focus on precedent represented a missed op-
portunity to address directly citizens’ expectations about the extent
to which the Constitution should provide special or absolute pro-
tection for property rights.
A. The “Doctrine” of Kelo
Kelo declined to find that “public use” required “use by the pub-
lic,” and instead found that “public use” was properly interpreted
to require only that the property taken be used for a “public pur-
pose.”49  The Court further found that economic development
could qualify as “public use,” even when the economic develop-
ment in question might benefit private parties.50  The Court thus
embraced the proposition that a generalized and merely hypotheti-
cal benefit to the public, achieved by the forced transfer of owner-
ship from one private party to another, could satisfy the “public
use” requirement.51
Had the Court been writing on a clean slate, this proposition
might indeed seem both outlandish and startling.  Prior case law,
however, made this result almost inevitable.52  The Court began by
noting that “while many state courts in the mid-19th century en-
dorsed ‘use by the public’ as the proper definition of public use,
46. On this “protective” function of property, see UNDERKUFFLER, supra note 17,
at 1-3; see also id. at 5 (describing the “‘common’ conception” of property, “in which
property functions to protect the individual against collective interests”).
47. See id. at 37-38 (“[T]he Takings Clause has provided the contemporary stage
for real and symbolic struggles among different visions of individual prerogative and
state power.”).
48. Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Popular Constitutionalism, Departmentalism, and
Judicial Supremacy, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1027, 1038 (2004) (analyzing the potential for a
balance between the rule of law and the people’s authority to speak on issues of con-
stitutional meaning).
49. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 479.
50. Id. at 484.
51. Id. at 487-88.
52. See supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text.  Even Justice Thomas, who dis-
sented, believed that the existing cases supported the Court’s holding. See supra note
45 (describing the difference between the O’Connor and Thomas dissents).
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that narrow view steadily eroded over time.”53  Because the “use
by the public” test was both difficult to administer and impractical,
“when this Court began applying the Fifth Amendment to the
States at the close of the 19th century, it embraced the broader and
more natural interpretation of public use as ‘public purpose.’”54
“Without exception,” the Court added, “our cases have defined
that concept broadly, reflecting our longstanding policy of defer-
ence to legislative judgments in this field.”55  Two noteworthy
twentieth century decisions, Berman v. Parker56 and Hawaii Hous-
ing Authority v. Midkiff,57 reaffirmed the law established in the
earlier cases and, more importantly, demonstrated why the emi-
nent domain power could not be cabined within the boundaries
petitioners had proposed.58
Berman was itself an urban redevelopment case, in which Con-
gress authorized the use of eminent domain in connection with a
slum clearance project in Washington, D.C.59  As in Kelo, the ap-
pellants argued that the taking of their property could not satisfy
the “public use” requirement; their property, they claimed, was not
blighted and therefore was not contributing to the problem the re-
development plan sought to solve.60  Moreover, it was to be
“put . . . under the management of a private, not a public, agency
and redeveloped for private, not public, use.”61
Writing for the Court in Berman, Justice Douglas asserted that
the judiciary’s role in determining what constitutes a public pur-
pose is “extremely narrow.”62  In language that has proven to be
pivotal, Douglas wrote that “when the legislature has spoken, the
public interest has been declared in terms well-nigh conclusive.  In
such cases the legislature, not the judiciary, is the main guardian of
the public needs to be served by social legislation.”63  The legisla-
ture’s authority extends, the Court held, not just to the ends to be
53. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 479.
54. Id. at 480.  For a historical treatment of the development of the concept of
“public use,” see Lawrence Berger, The Public Use Requirement in Eminent Domain,
57 OR. L. REV. 203, 204-25 (1978).
55. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 480.
56. 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
57. 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
58. The Court in Kelo also relied in part on Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto, 467 U.S. 986
(1984), which had applied Berman and Midkiff. See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 482.
59. Berman, 348 U.S. at 28-31.
60. Id. at 31
61. Id.
62. Id. at 32.
63. Id.
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served, but to the means by which those ends are to be
accomplished:
Here one of the means chosen is the use of private enterprise
for redevelopment of the area.  Appellants argue that this
makes the project a taking from one businessman for the benefit
of another businessman.  But the means of executing the project
are for Congress and Congress alone to determine, once the
public purpose has been established.64
This language raised obvious difficulties for the petitioners in
Kelo, as it clearly established that exercises of eminent domain that
move property from one private owner to another did not, on that
ground alone, violate the public use requirement.
This problematic aspect of Berman, coupled with its deferential
approach to exercises of legislative eminent domain power, was
only heightened in Midkiff. Midkiff challenged a 1967 statute en-
acted by the Hawaii Legislature designed to redress the State’s
problem of concentrated land ownership (the “1967 statute”).65
The Legislature had “discovered that, while the State and Federal
Governments owned almost 49% of the State’s land, another 47%
was in the hands of only 72 private landowners.”66  The concentra-
tion of land ownership “was responsible for skewing the State’s
residential fee simple market, inflating land prices, and injuring the
public tranquility and welfare.”67  The statute created “a mecha-
nism for condemning residential tracts and for transferring owner-
ship of the condemned fees simple to existing lessees.”68  The
statutory “mechanism” permitted tenants to request the Hawaii
Housing Authority (the “Housing Authority”) to condemn the
property on which they resided; if the Housing Authority deter-
mined that acquisition by the State would further the statute’s pub-
64. Id. at 33.
65. Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 232 (1984) (“The Hawaiian Islands
were originally settled by Polynesian immigrants from the western Pacific.  These set-
tlers developed an economy around a feudal land tenure system in which one island
high chief, the ali’i nui, controlled the land and assigned it for development to certain
subchiefs.  The subchiefs would then reassign the land to other lower ranking chiefs,
who would administer the land and govern the farmers and other tenants working it.
All land was held at the will of the ali’i nui and eventually had to be returned to his
trust.  There was no private ownership of land.  Beginning in the early 1800’s, Hawai-
ian leaders and American settlers repeatedly attempted to divide the lands of the
kingdom among the crown, the chiefs, and the common people.  These efforts proved
largely unsuccessful, however, and the land remained in the hands of a few.”).
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 233.
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lic purpose, it could acquire the land in question and transfer title
to the tenants.69
The appellees in Midkiff were owners who were on the verge of
losing title under the Hawaii statute; tenants had invoked the statu-
tory mechanism, and the Housing Authority had made the requi-
site determination that acquisition of appellees’ lands would serve
the purposes of the 1967 statute.70  Appellees filed suit in United
States District Court alleging, inter alia, that the statute was uncon-
stitutional.71  While the district court rejected their claim, the Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the 1967 statute violated
the “public use” requirement of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments.72  The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the statute did
in fact satisfy the “public use” requirement.73
Writing for the Court, Justice O’Connor relied heavily on
Berman, stating, “the Court has made clear that it will not substi-
tute its judgment for a legislature’s judgment as to what constitutes
a public use ‘unless the use be palpably without reasonable founda-
tion.’”74  In this instance, the Court found that the end to be
achieved—reducing “the perceived social and economic evils of a
land oligopoly”75—was “a classic exercise of a State’s police
power,” an exercise of which the Court “cannot disapprove.”76
Nor, the Court continued, could it “condemn as irrational the Act’s
approach to correcting the land oligopoly problem.”77  As in
Berman, the Court would defer not just to the state legislature’s
judgment about the ends to be achieved, but also to its choice of
means: “When the legislature’s purpose is legitimate and its means
are not irrational, our cases make clear that empirical debates over
the wisdom of takings—no less than debates over the wisdom of
other kinds of socioeconomic legislation—are not to be carried out
in the federal courts.”78
Again following Berman, the Court rejected the claim that “pub-
lic use” required actual use by the public, stating that the “mere
fact that property taken outright by eminent domain is transferred
69. Id. at 233-34.
70. Id. at 234.
71. Midkiff v. Tom, 483 F. Supp. 62, 64-65 (D. Haw. 1979).
72. Midkiff v. Tom, 702 F.2d 788, 789 (9th Cir. 1983).
73. Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 231-32.
74. Id. at 241 (quoting United States v. Gettysburg Elec. Ry. Co., 160 U.S. 668,
680 (1896)).
75. Id. at 241-42.
76. Id. at 242.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 242-43.
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in the first instance to private beneficiaries does not condemn that
taking as having only a private purpose.”79  And again, in language
strongly reminiscent of the words that proved critical in Berman,
the Court defined its role in public use cases in extremely deferen-
tial terms, holding that “if a legislature, state or federal, determines
there are substantial reasons for an exercise of the taking power,
courts must defer to its determination that the taking will serve a
public use.”80
Just as Midkiff extensively quoted language from Berman, the
Court in Kelo extensively quoted language from both Berman and
Midkiff, decisions it saw as consistent with the Court’s “earliest”
eminent domain cases which, the Court found, “embodied a strong
theme of federalism, emphasizing the ‘great respect’ that we owe to
state legislatures and state courts in discerning local public
needs.”81  Argument after argument urged by the petitioners was
rejected based on the historical pattern of deference made explicit
in Berman and Midkiff.  The homeowners in Kelo urged that eco-
nomic development could not qualify as a public use, but the Court
found that the cases undermined their claim:
[I]n Berman, we endorsed the purpose of transforming a
blighted area into a “well-balanced” community through rede-
velopment . . .  in Midkiff, we upheld the interest in breaking up
a land oligopoly that “created artificial deterrents to the normal
functioning of the State’s residential land market” . . . .  It would
be incongruous to hold that the City’s interest in the economic
benefits to be derived from the development of the Fort Trum-
bull area has less of a public character than any of those other
interests.82
Similarly, petitioners argued that the benefit to private parties
meant that the use could not be public, but the Court found that
79. Id. at 243-44.
80. Id. at 244.
81. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 482 (2005).  The Court continued:
“For more than a century, our pubic use jurisprudence has wisely eschewed rigid for-
mulas and intrusive scrutiny in favor of affording legislatures broad latitude in deter-
mining what public needs justify the use of the takings power.” Id. at 483.
82. Id. at 484-85.  For other situations where the Court also found requisite public
purposes in seemingly private takings, see Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto, 467 U.S. 986
(1984) (accepting Congress’ view that the elimination of significant barriers to the
pesticide market constituted a public purpose); Strickley v. Highland Boy Gold Min-
ing Co., 200 U.S. 527 (1906) (finding that public welfare demands aerial lines between
mines on the mountain and railways located in the valley below and therefore consti-
tuted a necessary public use).
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Berman and Midkiff “foreclose[d] this objection” as well.83
Midkiff had involved precisely the sort of “forced transfer” to
which petitioners were objecting in the case at hand, and Berman
had also permitted a “‘taking from one businessman for the benefit
of another businessman.’”84  Finally, petitioners argued that the
Court should require a “reasonable certainty” that the projected
public benefits would actually be realized, but again precedent—
particularly Midkiff’s holding that debates over the wisdom of tak-
ings did not belong in federal court—dictated that the claim be re-
jected.85  In the end, petitioners’ plea that the Court seriously
scrutinize either the development plan as a whole or the decision of
what lands were necessary to it was foreclosed by the broad defer-
ence mandated by earlier cases: “Once the question of the public
purpose has been decided, the amount and character of land to be
taken for the project and the need for a particular tract to complete
the integrated plan rests in the discretion of the legislative
branch.”86
As a matter of law, then, Kelo was not, as the Court saw it, a
complicated case.  The petitioners wished to cabin “public use”
within narrow bounds—use by the public, use other than economic
development—but these bounds had been rejected in prior deci-
sions that, in the Court’s view, were clearly applicable to Kelo.  As
a matter of judicial craft, the Court simply did what courts are sup-
posed to do—since the meaning of the constitutional text, “public
use,” was uncertain, the Court moved to judicial precedents.87
Those precedents settled the question at hand, so there was, as a
technical matter, almost nothing more for the Court to say.  To the
extent that the majority in Kelo regarded the issue of public use as
one that had already been decided, it could not participate in or
contribute to a dialogue concerning what the constraints on state
83. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 485.  In this context, the Court again adverted to Ruckelshaus
v. Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1014. See id.
84. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 486 (quoting Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954)).
85. See supra text accompanying note 74.
86. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 489 (quoting Berman, 348 U.S. at 35-36).
87. See Post, supra note 14, at 82:
The primary sources of constitutional law are specifically legal.  The text of
the Constitution is of course paramount . . . . But if the meaning of constitu-
tional text is uncertain, courts must look outside the text in order to make
constitutional law.  They can look to various legal sources . . . most com-
monly, judicial precedents.
See also LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 1-16 (3d ed. 2000)
(describing Supreme Court opinions as “in a sense a second set of constitutional
texts”).
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power ought ideally to be.  The Court did not suggest, however,
that this question of the scope of state power was unimportant.
Rather, the Court’s holding reflected the view that the question
had been concluded already and could not be reopened for debate
without comprehensive overruling of multiple prior decisions; the
legislature, not the courts, was the proper forum for such a change.
B. Kelo’s Apparent Indifference to Public Concerns About
Property Rights
Certainly there is reason to believe, based on both the language
of the opinion and statements made by Justice Stevens afterwards,
that the majority in Kelo was truly convinced that Berman and
Midkiff were just extensions of cases decided earlier.88  To the ex-
tent that the question of what constitutes a public use had already
been authoritatively determined by prior case law, there was not
much the Court could do to advance the discussion of how the
term “public use” might be defined if it were free to start from
scratch.
Consider, in this light, the Court’s statement toward the end of
its opinion that “nothing in our opinion precludes any State from
placing further restrictions on its exercise of the takings power.”89
Doctrinally, this suggestion would seem a simple logical correlate
of the Court’s position on the respective roles of state legislatures
and federal courts in interpreting “public use.”  As we just saw, the
cases establish that the Court must, in general, defer to local deter-
minations of whether a use is “public.”  If states choose to limit
their definitions of what constitutes a public use—either by statute
or by interpreting state constitutional provisions90—then why
88. See John Paul Stevens, Learning on the Job, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1561, 1566
(2006) (noting that Kelo was “not an example of ‘judicial activism’” and that the case
“adhered to precedent”).  Many legal scholars have asserted that Kelo broke no new
legal ground. See, e.g., Daniel H. Cole, Why Kelo Is Not Good News for Local Plan-
ners and Developers, 22 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 803, 803 (2006) (arguing that Kelo “did
not significantly alter eminent domain doctrine; the Court simply followed well-estab-
lished precedents”); Daniel J. Curtain, Jr., The Implications of Kelo in Land Use Law,
46 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 787, 787 (2006) (“[T]he Court’s decision in Kelo was not a
departure from precedent, or otherwise surprising.”); Thomas W. Merrill, Six Myths
About Kelo, PROB. & PROP., Jan.-Feb. 2006, at 19-20 (describing as a “myth” the
proposition that “Kelo breaks new ground by authorizing the use of eminent domain
solely for economic development”).
89. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 489.
90. Id.  The majority specifically cited County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d
765 (Mich. 2004), in which the Michigan Supreme Court, overruling Poletown Neigh-
borhood Council v. Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich. 1981), held that a County’s taking
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should the Court not equally defer to those local determinations as
well?
There are multiple ways to understand the Court’s invitation.
One is to see it as reflecting an institutionalist or legal process ap-
proach to takings questions, one that abandons the “difficult, if not
impossible, task of providing a clear normative justification for the
Takings Clause,” and instead directs takings jurisprudence toward
the more narrow question of “who should decide.”91  Another way
to understand the invitation in Kelo is as a reflection of what has
been called the “federalist dimension” of takings law.92  This view
holds that because “[t]he ‘property’ protected by the Takings
Clause is defined not by a single sovereign, but by the legislative
enactments and judicial pronouncements of fifty separate states,”
federalist concerns “make it inappropriate for the Court to use the
Takings Clause as a vehicle for articulating a comprehensive theory
of the limits of government power to regulate land.”93
Whether or not these explanations of the Court’s invitation are
correct, one observation is in order.  The Court’s eagerness to defer
to other decision making bodies, however appropriate from a legal
process or a federalist perspective, could equally be understood to
carry a secondary message, a message of indifference to the inten-
sity of the problem at hand.  The problem of overly broad state
power is, the Court suggests, not one that it needs to resolve; it is a
problem with which other, non-federal, legal bodies should wrestle.
There may be good reasons to believe that state and local gov-
ernments, closer to the action and to the actors affected by land use
planning measures, may indeed do better than the Court at defin-
ing the conditions under which eminent domain powers may be
exercised.94  But this allocation of power is not uncontroversial.  In
of land for transfer to private parties who planned to develop it as a business and
technology park violated the public use clause of the Michigan Constitution.
91. See Mark Fenster, The Takings Clause, Version 2005: The Legal Process of
Constitutional Property Rights 2 (2006) (unpublished manuscript,  on file with au-
thor), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=888755 (last vis-
ited Feb. 28, 2007).
92. Stewart E. Sterk, The Federalist Dimension of Regulatory Takings Jurispru-
dence, 114 YALE L.J. 203, 205 (2004) (arguing that “federalism concerns . . . do and
should play an important role in shaping the Court’s takings doctrine”).
93. Id.
94. See Carol M. Rose, Planning and Dealing: Piecemeal Land Controls as a Prob-
lem of Local Legitimacy, 71 CAL. L. REV. 839, 850 (1983) (describing how local deci-
sion making differs structurally from decision making at the state or federal level);
Carol M. Rose, Takings, Federalism, Norms, 105 YALE L.J. 1121, 1132 (1996) (describ-
ing how “exit” and “voice” can provide partial safeguards against overreaching at the
local level).  Of course, there may be reason to believe that local authorities may not
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at least one influential strand of thinking, property is prior to polit-
ics, and “preservation of the pre-political property of the people is
the measure of the goodness or badness of the state.”95  This strand
of thinking regards these principles as part of the Constitution,96 in
which case it is the specific duty of the Court to police and preserve
the sphere of private autonomy that property is meant to provide.97
To those inclined to see the Court as a guardian of private rights
against state overreaching,98 the suggestion that that overreaching
was not the Court’s problem could well seem an abdication.99
Moreover, legislative action, in general, is slow to come.  Even
the rash of post-Kelo legislative enactments—passed with lighten-
ing speed relative to much “ordinary” legislation100—could not ar-
do better than the Court.  For criticisms of some of the post-Kelo legislation on land
use planning grounds, see Cole, supra note 88, at 855-56; Julia D. Mahoney, Kelo’s
Legacy: Eminent Domain and the Future of Property Rights, 2005 SUP. CT. REV. 103,
125-29.  For criticism of such legislation on “expressive” grounds, see David A. Dana,
The Law and Expressive Meaning of Condemning the Poor After Kelo, 101 NW. U. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2007).
95. Carol M. Rose, Property as the Keystone Right?, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 329,
334 (1996) [hereinafter Rose, Keystone Right] (exploring seven views on why property
is the central constitutional right upon which all other rights rest).
96. See Margaret J. Radin, The Liberal Conception of Property: Cross Currents in
the Jurisprudence of Takings, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1667, 1668-69 (1988) (describing
how the neoconservative view maintains that the liberal conception of property—
encompassing exclusive rights of possession, use, and disposition—is “in” the
Constitution).
97. See Frank Michelman, Takings, 1987, 88 COLUM L. REV. 1600, 1626-27 (1988)
(describing how “property was [the founders’] inspiration for the idea of a private
sphere of individual self-determination securely bounded off from politics by law”
and how “reviewing courts came to be envisioned as enforcers of legal boundaries
demarcating mutually exclusive spheres of authority”); see also Laura S. Underkuf-
fler, On Property: An Essay, 100 YALE L.J. 127, 146 (1990) (“Contemporary ap-
proaches to property . . . proceed from a vision of property as that which protects, and
separates, the individual from the collective sphere.”).
98. Many are not so inclined and have challenged the separation of public and
private spheres in respect of property. See, e.g., Frank I. Michelman, Possession vs.
Distribution in the Constitutional Idea of Property, 72 IOWA L. REV. 1319, 1335 (1987)
(“[S]o-called private power is power no less constituted by public law than is govern-
mental power itself, specifically, if ironically, the very law that secures private prop-
erty against encroachment.”); see also JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, ENTITLEMENT: THE
PARADOXES OF PROPERTY 68 (2000) (“Property seems to require regulation.”).
99. See Kanner, supra note 4, at 216 (“Kelo did not involve the construction of
federal legislation . . . but instead the interpretation of an explicit provision of the
Federal Constitution.  If the interpretation of the federal Bill of Rights is not the
proper function of the federal judiciary . . . then what is?”). Cf. Post, supra note 14, at
43 (noting that “upsetting the entrenched constitutional beliefs of nonjudicial actors
entails costs in terms of both stability and legitimacy”).
100. See Cole, supra note 88, at 844 (“[T]he Kelo backlash has been remarkably
productive in the short period of time since the Supreme Court issued its ruling in
June of 2005.  In less than a year, four states have enacted laws of various significance
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rive in time to save Suzette Kelo.101  From the perspective of
constitutional culture, the possibility of some later action, by some
other legal authority, hardly addressed the immediate fear of gov-
ernment power running amok.  In this sense, the Court’s opinion
seems totally disconnected from the actual problem that gave rise
to the litigation.
C. Unrealized Possibilities
The public’s reaction to Kelo has been well-documented.102  The
case was widely reported in the press,103 and it continues to be dis-
cussed in numerous public fora.104  Scores of states have already
responded to the Court’s invitation by passing legislation imposing
in response to Kelo.  Congress has passed legislation in one house that is currently
pending in the other.  Dozens of other states have drafted legislation that it is cur-
rently under consideration; and in a majority of the remaining states, legislation cur-
rently is being drafted or planned.”); see also, e.g., S.J. Res. 20, 108th Leg., Reg. Sess.
(Fla. 2006) (suggesting a constitutional amendment providing that private economic
development “shall not be deemed to constitute public purpose for which private
property may be taken by eminent domain”).
101. Kelo’s house has, however, been saved. See William Yardley, After Eminent
Domain Victory, Disputed Project Goes Nowhere, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 2005, at A1;
see also Carolyn Battista, All Quiet on the Eastern Front: Six Months After the Kelo
Decision, the City of New London, Conn., Is at a Standstill, PRESERVATION ONLINE,
Jan. 13, 2006, http://www.nationaltrust.org/Magazine (follow “Online Archive” hyper-
link; then follow “Story of the Week” hyperlink; then scroll down to story) (indicating
that six months after Kelo, Suzette Kelo’s house was still standing).
102. See, e.g., Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 4 (describing libertarian, liberal,
and communitarian dissatisfaction with Kelo); Cole, supra note 88, at 819-44 (describ-
ing the political controversy sparked by Kelo, as well as state and local legislative
efforts to counteract the decision).  The “eminent domain abuse” pump was primed
by the extremely unpopular decision in Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of
Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich. 1981), in which the Michigan Supreme Court upheld
Detroit’s use of eminent domain to condemn an ethnic neighborhood to provide a site
for a General Motors plant.  On the reaction to Poletown, see JEANIE WYLIE,
POLETOWN: COMMUNITY BETRAYED (1989).  As the Court in Kelo noted, Poletown
was overruled in County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 2004). See
supra note 90.
103. See supra note 3.
104. For discussions of Kelo, as seen from the perspective of both the property own-
ers and the Government, see The National Constitution Center Homepage, http://
www.constitutioncenter.org (follow “Podcasts” hyperlink; then follow “Eminent Do-
main Post-Kelo” hyperlink) (last visited Jan. 22, 2007); “Eminent Domain: Its Uses
and Abuses,” http://www.cato.org/events/020514pf.html (follow “Listen to the Event”
hyperlink) (last visited Jan. 22, 2007). Kelo is also a major topic on many web sites.
See, e.g., Eminent Domain Watch Homepage, http://www.emdo.blogspot.com (last
visited Jan. 22, 2007); Reason Foundation: Free Minds and Free Markets Homepage,
http://www.reason.org/eminentdomain (last visited Jan. 22, 2007).
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limitations on the use of eminent domain for purposes of economic
redevelopment, and many others seem headed in that direction.105
Kelo’s galvanizing effects are not hard to understand.  The deci-
sion implicated important questions about the relation of property
ownership and government.  Is property a pre-political right that
the state must absolutely respect and protect,106 or can the state
adjust property rights to the end, for example, of managing con-
gested resources?107  In addition, Kelo raised highly charged ques-
tions about whether all property should be treated alike for
eminent domain purposes—for any number of reasons, the type of
property at issue in the Kelo case, a home, might warrant special
treatment by the law.108  Finally, as Justice Thomas’s dissent made
clear, Kelo raised disturbing issues of race and class, issues of
whether some groups are disproportionately targets of “redevelop-
ment” efforts that disrupt their communities or signal a view of
105. For eminent domain legislation in response to Kelo, see The National Confer-
ence of State Legislatures Homepage, supra note 31 (noting that, in 2005, thirteen
states considered legislation in response to Kelo, with four states enacting laws and
one state passing a constitutional amendment that will go on ballot for voter
approval).
106. See Rose, Keystone Right, supra note 95, at 333 (describing the argument that
“[p]roperty is the key to all other rights because it is prior to politics, and hence the
basis upon which all other civil rights rest”). But see Carol M. Rose, Mahon Recon-
structed: Why the Takings Issue Is Still a Muddle, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 561, 595 (1984)
[hereinafter Rose, Mahon Reconstructed] (“The concept of a prepolitical property
right is problematic, primarily because it fails to address the question of what it means
to ‘own’ anything in the absence of the community’s protection.”).
107. Carol M. Rose, Property and Expropriation: Themes and Variations in Ameri-
can Law, 2000 UTAH L. REV. 1, 19-20 (2000) [hereinafter Rose, Property and
Expropriation].
108. See D. Benjamin Barros, Home as a Legal Concept, 46 SANTA CLARA L. REV.
255, 258 (2006) (arguing that eminent domain law “under-protect[s] the personal in-
terest in the home”); Jeremy Paul, The Hidden Structure of Takings Law, 64 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1393, 1542-43 (1991) (suggesting that one strand of a “richer description of
takings controversies” might involve “judicial specification of concrete aspects of
human existence that the takings clause is designed to protect.  Thus . . . courts might
note certain objects, such as one’s home, that a constitution would sensibly mark out
as deserving of special protection.”); Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood,
34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 991-92 (1982) (describing a home as “a moral nexus between
liberty, privacy, and freedom of association,” and suggesting that therefore homes
need special protection as “property for personhood”); see also Wendell E. Pritchett,
Beyond Kelo: Thinking About Urban Development in the 21st Century, 22 GA. ST. U.
L. REV. 895, 908 (2006) (“Given America’s obsession with homeownership, it is
hardly surprising that an overwhelming majority of the public is concerned that the
government may take the homes of fellow citizens.”).
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those groups as being outside of or “other to” our property
system.109
These questions are of enormous significance, but once the
Court concluded that its precedents disposed of all the issues that
were raised by the Kelo claimants, there was no reason to discuss
them in its opinion.  This simple refusal to acknowledge how highly
charged the issues were may account for the depth and breadth of
dissatisfaction with Kelo.110  In any event, the effect of the Court’s
emphasis on prior cases was to eliminate itself as either a leader or
a participant in debates over the deeper issues with which the pub-
lic is concerned.  The Court’s holding may be totally justified as a
matter of fidelity to precedent, and in this sense, Kelo is an “easy”
case.  By seeing it in these terms, however, the Court deprived it-
self of a chance to engage in the volatile issues that underlay the
dispute.
It would, of course, not have been impossible for the Court to try
harder to limit, distinguish, or reinterpret the prior case law.  In-
deed, in dissent, Justice O’Connor did precisely that, asserting that
in fact both Berman and Midkiff were cases where the eminent
domain power had been asserted to eliminate an “affirmative
harm” deriving from the targeted property: “blight” in Berman and
“oligopoly” in Midkiff.111  It is easy to quibble with O’Connor’s in-
terpretation of the prior cases: the particular property at issue in
Berman was concededly not itself blighted, and no single piece of
land, including the parcel at issue in Midkiff, can itself cause an
oligopoly.  But however controversial her conclusions, O’Connor’s
willingness to reconsider the meaning of Berman and Midkiff al-
lowed her to discuss the public use issue in a way that fully engaged
cultural understandings of the Takings Clause.112
109. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 522 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissent-
ing) (“Urban renewal projects have long been associated with the displacement of
blacks . . . .  Regrettably, the predictable consequence of the Court’s decision will be
to exacerbate these effects.”); Rose, Property and Expropriation, supra note 107, at
24-38 (describing “revolutionary expropriations” that “were worked on people who
were perceived to be nonmembers of the community” and viewing these appropria-
tions as “a part of a radical othering”); see also Carol M. Rose, Introduction: Property
and Language, or, the Ghost of the Fifth Panel, 18 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1, 23 (2006)
(“What the owner reads into the alleged taking may well be the subtext: You do not
matter.”).
110. See Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 4, at 1423-26 (describing dissatisfaction
with Kelo from  “commentators of diverse, and often conflicting, political persua-
tions,” including libertarians, communitarians, liberals, economists, and politicians).
111. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 500-01 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
112. Ironically, it was Justice O’Connor who wrote the Court’s opinion in Midkiff,
an opinion that many regard as the source of the problem that ultimately came to
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O’Connor begins by describing the Fifth Amendment as a con-
straint on state power.  The Takings Clause’s “two limitations”—
that the taking be for “public use” and that “just compensation” be
paid—“ensure stable property ownership by providing safeguards
against excessive, unpredictable, or unfair use of the government’s
eminent domain power—particularly against those owners who, for
whatever reasons, may be unable to protect themselves in the polit-
ical process against the majority’s will.”113  O’Connor acknowl-
edges the need to defer to legislative determinations about public
use, but concludes that, if the Takings Clause is to operate as a limit
on inappropriate exercises of state power, deference cannot be
absolute:
Where is the line between “public” and “private” property use?
We give considerable deference to legislatures’ determinations
about what governmental activities will advantage the public.
But were the political branches the sole arbiters of the public-
private distinction, the Public Use Clause would amount to little
more than hortatory fluff.  An external, judicial check on how
the public use requirement is interpreted, however limited, is
necessary if this constraint on government power is to retain any
meaning.114
The notions that there are limits to state power, and that the
function of the Constitution is to protect stable expectations
against governmental unfairness, are deeply imbued in our consti-
tutional culture, with its dominant “ownership model” of prop-
erty.115  So too is the view that judicial deference cannot be
appropriate if the Fifth Amendment is to function, as it should, to
check illegitimate exercises of legislative power.
This is not to say that O’Connor’s attempt to distinguish Berman
and Midkiff is ultimately persuasive.116  What is important about
fruition in Kelo. See, e.g., EPSTEIN, supra note 16, at 110 (asserting that in Midkiff,
“the Supreme Court . . . obliterated a key structural distinction by holding that the
scope of the public use requirement of the Takings Clause is coterminous with the
scope of a sovereign’s police powers”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
113. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 505 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
114. Id. at 497.
115. On the ownership model, see SINGER, supra note 98, at 3, 6-9. See also Laura
S. Underkuffler, Tahoe’s Requiem: The Death of the Scalian View of Property and
Justice, 21 CONST. COMMENT. 727, 731 (2004) (describing the “Scalian” or “conserva-
tive” view of property).
116. See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 486 n.16 (majority opinion) (“[O]ur cases [do not] sup-
port Justice O’Connor’s novel theory that the government may only take property
and transfer it to private parties when the initial taking eliminates some ‘harmful
property use.’”).
\\server05\productn\F\FUJ\34-2\FUJ202.txt unknown Seq: 22 31-MAY-07 9:25
634 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XXXIV
O’Connor’s dissent is that it takes up explicitly the themes that
characterize the public discourse about eminent domain.  How
much protection are owners entitled to?  Who will restrain govern-
ments when they act unfairly?  These questions, so simple to state,
so difficult to answer, animate our constitutional culture of prop-
erty.  The facts of Kelo put these questions squarely on the table.
The majority’s refusal to acknowledge them—however correct as a
matter of judicial craft—is the deepest problem of the Kelo
opinion.
II. LINGLE’S PROMISE
Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. is, as noted earlier, a “regulatory
takings” case, not an eminent domain case.117  “Regulatory tak-
ings” involve the losses that can arise from what seem to be per-
fectly ordinary governmental regulations, such as zoning or
wetlands preservation ordinances, that can impose high costs on
landowners affected by them.  In the Court’s famous 1922 decision
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,118  the Court held that such losses
could be compensable under the Fifth Amendment even in the ab-
sence of any physical taking by the government; in the words of
Justice Holmes, “while property may be regulated to a certain ex-
tent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.”119
Since Mahon, numerous regulations have been challenged as go-
ing “too far,” and the Court has struggled to articulate a workable
doctrinal standard to implement the “too far” idea.120  The Court
acknowledged its own befuddlement in Penn Central Transporta-
tion Co. v. City of New York.121  The Court’s analysis began with
Armstrong’s basic formulation that “the Fifth Amendment’s guar-
antee . . .  [is] designed to bar Government from forcing some peo-
ple alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice,
should be borne by the public as a whole.”122  But it admitted that
“this Court, quite simply, has been unable to develop any ‘set
formula’ for determining when ‘justice and fairness’ require that
economic injuries caused by public action be compensated by the
government, rather than remain disproportionately concentrated
117. 544 U.S. 528, 531 (2005).
118. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
119. Id. at 415.
120. See Rose, Mahon Reconstructed, supra note 106, at 562 n.6 (describing com-
mentators’ observations of the incoherence of the Court’s takings decisions following
Mahon).
121. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
122. Id. at 123 (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)).
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on a few persons.”123  The Court described itself as having engaged
in previous cases in what it characterized as “essentially ad hoc,
factual inquiries,” centering on “several factors that have particular
significance,”124 including the “economic impact of the regulation
on the claimant,” the “extent to which the regulation has interfered
with distinct investment-backed expectations,” and “the character
of the governmental action.”125
Penn Central’s ad hoc “test,” with its multiple factors, was never
a model of clarity.126  Since the Court in Penn Central explicitly
denied that there was a “set formula” for determining regulatory
takings questions, it was not surprising that there soon developed
variations on the Penn Central standard, including Agins’s formula-
tion that a regulation could effect a taking “if the ordinance does
not substantially advance legitimate state interests . . . or denies an
owner economically viable use of his land.”127  Regulatory takings
doctrine only became more complicated when the Court carved
out two regulatory situations that were deemed to constitute tak-
ings per se, without regard to the public purposes served or to the
factors balanced under Penn Central’s analysis, the first involving
“a permanent physical occupation authorized by government,”128
and the second involving regulations that deprive owners of “all
123. Id. at 124.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. See Susan Rose-Ackerman, Against Ad Hocery: A Comment on Michelman, 88
COLUM. L. REV. 1697, 1699-1700 (1988) (arguing that there was no pattern to the
decisions in the cases decided after Penn Central).  Carol Rose has argued, in contrast,
that this lack of predictability is a function of the post hoc nature of regulatory takings
determinations, and that the ad hoc nature of these decisions should be regarded posi-
tively rather than negatively.  Carol M. Rose, Property Rights, Regulatory Regimes
and the New Takings Jurisprudence—An Evolutionary Approach, 57 TENN. L. REV.
577, 590 (1990) [hereinafter Rose, Evolutionary Approach].
Like nuisance adjudications, takings adjudications are post hoc judicial de-
terminations and are based generally on ordinary practice and reasonable
expectations about which regulatory efforts are fair and normal, and which
are not.  As with nuisance law, this post hoc and ad hoc judicial second-
guessing makes possible gradual changes in the relationship between the
regulated and the regulators, and provides for a change in ordinary regula-
tory practice—however theoretically unsatisfactory this ad hoc approach
may be.
Id.
127. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980) (holding that the city’s
open-space land zoning ordinance, which restricted a previously purchased five acre
tract of land to single-family residences and open-space use, did not effect a taking).
128. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982)
(discussing whether a statute providing that a landlord must permit a cable television
company to install its facilities upon his property constitutes a taking).
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economically beneficial or productive use of land.”129  Finally, the
Court added insult to injury by enunciating separate tests for eval-
uating takings claims arising in the context of exactions.130
The proliferation of “tests” for evaluating whether regulatory ac-
tion would constitute a taking led fairly predictably to a situation
where the principal question to be decided in regard to regulatory
takings claims appeared to be one of classification—did the case
fall into one of the per se categories, did it involve an exaction, or
was it an “ordinary” case to be governed by Penn Central balanc-
ing?131  Formulated this way, the claims involved the Court in a
wholesale sorting operation, diverting attention from the basic
“fairness and justice” issues that it had said in both Armstrong and
Penn Central were at the heart of regulatory takings problems.
It is in this context that Lingle is best understood. Lingle in-
volved a Hawaii statute limiting the rent that oil companies could
charge to lessee-dealers.132  The statute was designed to protect the
state’s consumers from high gasoline prices arising from the
“highly concentrated” market for oil products resulting from “Ha-
waii’s small size and geographic isolation.”133  Chevron, Hawaii’s
largest gasoline refiner and marketer, claimed that the rent cap ef-
fected a taking of its property because the rent cap would not actu-
ally reduce prices and therefore did not “substantially advance” a
129. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992) (discussing situations
where the Supreme Court had found categorical treatment appropriate).
130. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994) (requiring a showing of
“rough proportionality” between the problem government seeks to address and the
condition imposed to redress it); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n,  483 U.S. 825, 837
(1987) (requiring an “essential nexus” between the condition imposed and the gov-
ernment’s reason for imposing it).  Exactions are improvements, dedications, or fees
imposed on owners as conditions for subdivision or development. See DANIEL R.
MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW § 9.11 (5th ed. 2003).
131. In both Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001), and Tahoe-Sierra Pres-
ervation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302 (2002), the
owners attempted to characterize their cases as per se takings by focusing on the part
of their property that was rendered valueless under the regulatory regime in question,
while the government defendants responded by noting the values remaining to the
owners even after the regulatory “loss” was factored in.  The Court in Lucas had
anticipated this problem, noting that its deprivation-of-value rule “does not make
clear the ‘property interest’ against which the loss of value is to be measured.” Lucas,
505 U.S. at 1016 n.7.
Claims such as those raised by the owners in Palazzolo and Tahoe-Sierra illustrate a
problem Margaret Radin has called “conceptual severance.”  Radin, supra note 96, at
1676 (explaining that conceptual severance “consists of delineating a property interest
consisting of just what the government action has removed from the owner, and then
asserting that the particular whole thing has been permanently taken”).
132. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 533 (2005).
133. Id. at 532-33.
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legitimate state interest as was required by Agins.134  The lower
courts accepted both that the Agins test applied and that Chevron’s
experts had persuasively shown that the rent cap would not achieve
its intended purpose.135
The Court defined the issue before it narrowly: “This case re-
quires us to decide whether the ‘substantially advances’ formula
announced in Agins is an appropriate test for determining whether
a regulation effects a Fifth Amendment taking.”136  Concluding
that the Agins formula “prescribes an inquiry in the nature of a due
process, not a takings, test,” the Court held that it “has no proper
place in our takings jurisprudence.”137  This approach provided the
Court an opportunity to explain the factors that, in its view, funda-
mentally differentiate takings from due process claims and, in the
process, to define the issues at the heart of takings analyses.  Those
issues, as articulated by Justice O’Connor for the Court, concern
the “magnitude or character of the burden a particular regulation
imposes upon private property rights,” as well as the question of
how the regulatory “burden is distributed among property
owners.”138
Part A of this section explores Lingle doctrinally, focusing on the
opinion’s implications for the framing of takings claims.  At the
very least, the Court in Lingle cleared away some of the doctrinal
clutter that had accumulated around regulatory takings jurispru-
dence, establishing the Penn Central balancing test139 as the norm
in takings cases and affirming that the per se tests applicable in
Loretto140 and in Lucas141 are to be considered exceptional.  Part B
asserts that Lingle returned takings law to its central question, the
question of the distribution of the burdens of regulatory interven-
tions.  The question of what “fairness and justice” do require when
government regulation affects some individuals or entities more
134. Id. at 533-34.
135. Id. at 534-36; see Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Bronster, 363 F.3d 846 (9th Cir. 2004);
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Cayetano, 57 F. Supp. 2d 1003 (D. Haw. 1998).
136. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 532.
137. Id. at 540.
138. Id. at 542.
139. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 130-31 (1978) (“In
deciding whether a particular governmental action has effected a taking, this Court
focuses . . . both on the character of the action and on the nature and extent of the
interference with rights in the parcel as a whole.”).
140. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982) (hold-
ing that a permanent physical occupation of private property authorized by the gov-
ernment is a per se taking).
141. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992) (holding that a statute that
effectively prevents all economically viable uses of property is a per se taking).
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than others is at the center of the muddle of regulatory takings law.
This return to Armstrong’s basic question is not insignificant; the
Court in Lingle could simply have corrected Agins’s doctrinal error
and stopped.  By openly addressing the purposes of the Takings
Clause, the Court connected to the larger cultural debate that it
had sidestepped in Kelo about the relation between private prop-
erty and the public good.  As we have seen, “the struggle over
property rights is really about the contours of our social life and
the definitions of community: who counts?”142  By suggesting that
sometimes individual landowners might be disproportionately and
unfairly burdened by otherwise lawful regulation, the Court ac-
knowledged that takings cases do send a message about who mat-
ters—and about whose property matters—when the government
seeks to promote what it regards as the public good.  Part C argues
that though the Court did not resolve the “fairness and justice”
question, it nonetheless moved regulatory takings law in a produc-
tive direction.  All regulations inevitably burden some citizens
more than others.  The “magnitude” and “distribution” factors
highlighted in Lingle suggest how the Court might evaluate that
inevitable inequality in the future.  More importantly, they set the
terms—and thus the frame—for a dialogue between the Court and
nonjudicial actors over the connection between regulation and
property.
A. The “Doctrine” of Lingle
The essence of Chevron’s claim in Lingle was that the statute in
question would not accomplish its stated objective; the rent cap
would not in fact protect consumers from high gasoline prices.143
Under the Agins “substantially advances” test, such a claim, if
proven, would render the statute a “taking.”  The test had the obvi-
ous potential to create anomalies between due process and takings
challenges.  Were Chevron to have asserted its claim under the
Due Process Clause, the statute would easily have met the “ra-
tional relation” standard that the Court has applied in economic
regulation cases since Lochner.144  Thus, if the Agins formula had
been upheld, statutes that clearly would be found valid as a matter
142. Gerald Torres, Visions of Guadalupe: Traces of the Ghost Panel, 18 YALE J.L.
& HUMAN. 161, 167 (2006) [hereinafter Torres, Visions of Guadalupe].
143. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 532-35.
144. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).  The Court repudiated Lochner in
West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).  For a general discussion of
Lochner, see David E. Bernstein, Lochner v. New York: A Centennial Retrospective,
83 WASH. U. L.Q. 1469 (2005) (discussing the case and its legacy on current constitu-
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of substantive due process (because they might conceivably ad-
vance a legitimate state interest) could be found invalid as a matter
of takings law (because they might not “substantially advance” that
same state interest).
The Court in Lingle held that Agins had wrongfully conflated
what should have been distinguishable and distinct questions. “The
‘substantially advances’ formula,” O’Connor wrote, “suggests a
means-ends test: It asks, in essence, whether a regulation of private
property is effective in achieving some legitimate public pur-
pose.”145  While such an inquiry “has some logic in the context of a
due process challenge,” it “is not a valid method of discerning
whether private property has been ‘taken’ for purposes of the Fifth
Amendment”146 because the Takings Clause is concerned with
“regulations whose effects are functionally comparable to govern-
ment appropriation or invasion of private property,” not regula-
tions that fail to carry out their ostensible objectives.147  Thus, the
question of a regulation’s “underlying validity” under the Due Pro-
cess Clause is “logically prior to and distinct from the question
whether a regulation effects a taking, for the Takings Clause pre-
supposes that the government has acted in pursuit of a valid public
purpose.”148
In addition to noting the distinct purposes of the Due Process
and Takings Clauses—the former being directed at effectiveness
and the latter at disproportionate burdens—the Court acknowl-
edged what it called the “practical difficulties” presented  by the
“substantially advances” formula:
tional debates with respect to the battle between state authority and individual
rights).
Academic commentators had, prior to Lingle, repeatedly criticized Agins on pre-
cisely the ground that it would covertly reinstate Lochner. See, e.g., Edward J. Sulli-
van, Emperors and Clothes: The Genealogy and Operation of the Agins’ Tests, 33 URB.
LAW. 343, 361-62 (2001) (describing the academic criticism of Agins; see also Ronald
J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Expropriatory Intent: Defining the Proper Boundaries of Substan-
tive Due Process and the Takings Clause, 80 N.C. L. REV. 713, 715 (2002) (arguing that
“the Due Process Clauses, rather than the Takings Clause, should serve as the source
of a generalized constitutional protection of property rights against arbitrary or fun-
damentally unfair government actions”).
145. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 542.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 543.  In contrast to Kelo, the Court does not use the words “public pur-
pose” here as a synonym for “public use.”  In context, the Court means that, for pur-
poses of Takings Clause analysis, it will be presumed that the government is
furthering a legitimate state interest when it effectuates a taking.
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The Agins formula can be read to demand heightened means-
ends review of virtually any regulation of private property.  If so
interpreted, it would require courts to scrutinize the efficacy of a
vast array of state and federal regulations—a task for which
courts are not well suited.  Moreover, it would empower—and
might often require—courts to substitute their predictive judg-
ments for those of elected legislatures and expert agencies.149
The dueling experts in the Lingle case, with their divergent views
of the probable effects of the legislation in question, illustrated the
problems courts faced under the Agins test: “To resolve Chevron’s
takings claim, the District Court was required to choose between
the views of two opposing economists as to whether [the Hawaii
statute] would help to prevent concentration and supracompetitive
prices in the State’s retail gasoline market.”150  The Court charac-
terized the proceedings in the lower courts as “remarkable, to say
the least, given that we have long eschewed such heightened scru-
tiny when addressing substantive due process challenges to govern-
ment regulation.”151
Doctrinally, then, Lingle drew a clear line between the Due Pro-
cess Clause and the Takings Clause, finding them to be directed
toward distinct questions.  It prescribed a sequencing between the
analyses under the two clauses, with substantive due process ques-
tions to be raised first and, assuming the statute in question with-
stands due process scrutiny (a safe assumption for economic
regulation), takings scrutiny to follow.152  Finally, the Lingle Court
rejected the opportunity to use the Takings Clause to reinstate a
Lochner-like standard for judicial review of economic regulations
and affirmed that it would continue to defer to legislative judg-
ments “about the need for, and likely effectiveness of, regulatory
actions.”153
B. Defining the Heart of the Takings Clause
Determining what differentiates due process from takings claims
provided the Court with an opportunity to define what is distinct
about the latter.  If takings claims are not about means-ends effec-
tiveness, what are they about?  The Court sought the answer in
149. Id. at 544.
150. Id. at 544-45.
151. Id. at 545.
152. Id. at 543 (“[I]f a government action is found to be impermissible—for in-
stance because it . . . is so arbitrary as to violate due process—that is the end of the
inquiry.  No amount of compensation can authorize such action.”).
153. Id. at 545.
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prior case law. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.154
established that “where government requires an owner to suffer a
permanent physical invasion of her property—however minor—it
must provide just compensation.”155  A regulatory action would
also be considered a taking per se under Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council,156 if it “completely deprive[s] an owner of ‘all eco-
nomically beneficial use’ of her property.”157  Finally, a taking
might be found under Penn Central depending on its economic im-
pact, its character, or its interference with investment-backed
expectations.158
These three inquiries, the Court stated, “share a common touch-
stone”159: “Each aims to identify regulatory actions that are func-
tionally equivalent to the classic taking in which government
directly appropriates private property or ousts the owner from his
domain.  Accordingly, each of these tests focuses directly upon the
severity of the burden that government imposes upon private prop-
erty rights.”160  The Court’s formulation of the “common touch-
stone” is telling.  The direct appropriation or physical invasion of
private property stands as paradigmatic—the closer the regulatory
action comes to imposing the kind of harm involved in appropria-
tions and invasions, the more likely it is to be deemed a taking.161
The test for a taking must “help to identify those regulations whose
effects are functionally comparable to government appropriation
or invasion of private property.”162  Only such a test can be
tethered to “the basic justification for allowing regulatory actions
to be challenged under the [Takings] Clause.”163
Here we see the Court seeking the heart or center of the Takings
Clause.  It defines that heart in terms of the kind of injury suffered
when there is a direct appropriation.  Such an injury is distinct in
“magnitude” and in the way in which it is “distributed among prop-
154. 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
155. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 538 (looking to Loretto in holding that permanent physical
invasions constitute per se takings); see also Loretto, 458 U.S. at 434-35.
156. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
157. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 538 (quoting Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019).
158. Id. at 538-39.
159. Id. at 539.
160. Id.
161. Permanent physical invasions, like appropriations, eliminate the right to ex-
clude; elimination of value, like appropriations, deprive owners of beneficial use. Id.
at 539-40.
162. Id. at 542.
163. Id.
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erty owners.”164  The Court in Lingle thus returned takings analysis
to its basic Armstrong focus on whether some citizens are being
asked to bear alone “public burdens which, in all fairness and jus-
tice, should be borne by the public as a whole.”165  The Court sug-
gested in Lingle that “fairness and justice” require compensation
when a regulatory action imposes a particularly strong burden on
private property rights or when that burden is distributed narrowly
rather than broadly.166
The Court in Lingle did not purport to set out a new “test” for
determining specific takings claims.  Rather, it spoke generally to
the aim of the Takings Clause for purposes of distinguishing it from
the Due Process Clause.  Nevertheless, the Court’s abstract state-
ments about the bedrock concerns of the Takings Clause provide a
framework for understanding the various tests enunciated in prior
cases.  The per se rules for permanent physical invasions and com-
plete deprivations of economic value, along with the Penn Central
inquiry for all other cases, are best understood as instantiations of
the Takings Clause’s overall concern with the magnitude and distri-
bution of regulatory burdens.  The two categories of per se takings
replicate the kinds of burdens imposed in actual physical takings;
other regulations will be found to be takings under Penn Central
where they can be shown to impose “equivalent” burdens.167  The
rather different tests for exactions enunciated in Nollan v. Califor-
nia Coastal Commission168 and Dolan v. City of Tigard169 fit exactly
into this model; in the Court’s view, both cases “involved dedica-
tions of property so onerous that, outside the exactions context,
they would be deemed per se physical takings.”170
To summarize, in Lingle the Court contextualized existing doctri-
nal tests for regulatory takings in terms of the larger issues it as-
serted lie at the heart of the Takings Clause.  Those issues have to
do with the magnitude and distribution of the burdens inevitably
imposed by governmental regulatory activity.  To some extent, the
Court’s emphasis on the distributional question merely returned it
to the basic “fairness and justice” focus of Armstrong, which posed
164. Id.
165. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
166. 544 U.S. at 542-43.
167. See id. at 539.
168. 483 U.S. 825 (1987) (requiring an “essential nexus” between the condition im-
posed and the government’s reason for imposing it).
169. 512 U.S. 374 (1994) (requiring a showing of “rough proportionality” between
the problem government seeks to address and the condition imposed to redress it).
170. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 547.
\\server05\productn\F\FUJ\34-2\FUJ202.txt unknown Seq: 31 31-MAY-07 9:25
2007] KELO AND LINGLE 643
the fundamental question of the Takings Clause in precisely those
terms.
To understand why this return may be a positive step, consider
an alternative way the Court could have decided Lingle, a way fo-
cusing exclusively on prior case law.  The question, recall, was only
whether the “substantially advances” formula was a correct takings
test.  To answer it, the Court looked to the precedents from which
that formula was derived—exactly the strategy employed in Kelo in
evaluating various formulations of the “public use” requirement.
The precedents that led to Agins, the Court found, relied on due
process analysis.  The “commingling” of due process and takings
inquiries was “understandable,” but “imprecise” and ultimately
“not a valid method of discerning whether private property has
been ‘taken’ for purposes of the Fifth Amendment.”171
As a legal process matter, the Court could have ended its opin-
ion just at this point.  It had framed the narrow legal question,
identified the legal precedents that underlay the controversial legal
formulation at issue, and distinguished them.  Technically speaking,
there was nothing left to decide.
But an opinion that stopped at this point would have been tre-
mendously unsatisfying in precisely the way that Kelo is unsatisfy-
ing, because it would not have engaged powerful, deeply felt, and
widely shared popular understandings of government’s responsibil-
ity with respect to private property.  As “property rights” move-
ments attest, regulations that unquestionably serve legitimate state
purposes and therefore easily satisfy due process requirements
often feel enormously burdensome and arbitrary to citizens af-
fected by them.172  Those who at some previous point bought land
in hopes of later building homes take little solace from subse-
quently-enacted open space regulations or development moratoria
that prevent that construction, even if those measures can be con-
clusively shown to provide social benefits to others.173  Notice how
171. Id. at 540-42.
172. Rose, Property and Expropriation, supra note 107, at 18-20 (describing own-
ers’ expectations that they can continue to use property in the ways to which they
have become accustomed, even though such usage has become harmful).
173. Id. See also Carol M. Rose, A Dozen Propositions on Private Property, Public
Rights, and the New Takings Legislation, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 265, 284 (1996).
Carol Rose has stated:
[P]ublic authorities may be quite late in determining that particular private
land uses cause damage to other persons and to public resources, or they
may have suggested that these uses could continue.  In the meantime, own-
ers may have innocently sunk capital into their land uses in the expectation
of being permitted to continue to consume public resources . . . . Halting
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easy it is to see a taking in such regulation.  One only has to posit
the following:
The Constitution requires that property be understood as a bun-
dle of rights, each one a part of the value of the whole, but valu-
able in itself.  When the value of any one of the rights in the
bundle is eliminated the state must compensate the property
owner for the loss of the value of the right regardless of the
remaining value of the whole parcel.174
This view is highly contestable, given its “[e]levation of the ex-
tant distribution of entitlements and liabilities to a matter of princi-
ple,”175 yet the cultural notion that at least sometimes the state
should pay for the benefits it attains from owners’ sacrifices makes
considerable intuitive sense.176  In acknowledging that the distribu-
tion of regulatory burdens is a question of constitutional moment,
the Court in Lingle showed itself to be connected to the constitu-
tional culture of public beliefs regarding property rights.
C. Lingle’s Potential
I have argued thus far that in Lingle the Court returned to older
formulations of the regulatory takings problem and in so doing
connected to constitutional culture.  The importance of this ap-
proach can be seen in two ways, one having to do with the pattern
of regulatory cases immediately preceding Lingle, and the other
having to do with the inquiry towards which Lingle directs courts in
the future.
If the Court had applied Penn Central to every subsequent regu-
latory takings claim, over time the cases might have grown some-
what less “ad hoc” and more “regular,” and the “factors” deemed
of “particular significance”—economic impact, interference with
economic expectations, and character of governmental activity—
might have been systematically elaborated.  The muddy standards
and unpredictable balancing that the Court in Penn Central set out
as more or less a second-best solution to the regulatory takings
such uses may result in the deadweight loss of expenditures that the owner
has already made—deadweight in the sense that the expenditures become
useless either to the owner or to anyone else.
Id.
174. Torres, Taking and Giving, supra note 28, at 14.
175. Id. at 13.
176. See Torres, Visions of Guadalupe, supra note 142, at 170 (“The property rights
movement has its share of cranks, but the reason it has gained such a purchase on
policy makers and judges is that it has been able to tell a story with emotional and
ideological resonance that connects it to what we think about ourselves.”).
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muddle177 might have evolved into a more crystalline rule for eval-
uating regulatory takings claims.178  This arguably-unrealistic possi-
bility was never tested.  Soon after Penn Central, the Court
developed its per se rules for permanent physical invasions and for
total deprivations of economic value, while enunciating still differ-
ent standards for takings claims arising in the context of exactions.
The effect of this proliferation of legal tests was predictable.
Owners would try to categorize their injury as one falling into one
of the per se categories, or would argue that their case warranted
the more rigorous scrutiny applied to exactions.  Thus, in both Pal-
azzolo v. Rhode Island179 and Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council,
Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency,180 the owners sought to
characterize the impact of the regulations in question as a total
deprivation of economic value, in order to take advantage of the
Lucas categorical taking rule. The issue thus became whether the
taking in question either was subject to one of the per se rules (i.e.,
involved a permanent physical occupation or a complete depriva-
tion of economic value), or instead was subject to Penn Central bal-
ancing.  Rather than elaborating on the meaning of the Penn
Central factors, the Court was forced in many cases to decide if
those factors applied at all.181
Although the Court has largely seen through claimants’ efforts
to “conceptually sever” a spatial or temporal portion of their larger
ownership interest,182 Lingle has the potential to change the focus
177. Recall that the Court in Penn Central described itself  as “unable” to develop a
“set formula” for determining takings questions. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City
of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
178. On muddy standards and crystalline rules in property generally, see Carol M.
Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577 (1988). See also
Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L.
REV. 1685 (1976) (addressing the problem of the choice between standards and rules
as the form for legal directives); Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Justices of Rules and Stan-
dards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22 (1992) (describing and discussing the standard/rule
dichotomy).
179. 533 U.S. 606 (2001).
180. 535 U.S. 302 (2002).
181. This is not to say that the Court never confronted a case squarely presenting
the issue of whether a taking had been shown under Penn Central.  It did so in, inter
alia, Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704 (1987), and Babbitt v. Youpee, 519 U.S. 234 (1997).
182. See, e.g., Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 331. The Court stated:
Petitioners seek to bring this case under the rule announced in Lucas by
arguing that we can effectively sever a 32-month segment from the remain-
der of each landowner’s fee simple estate, and then ask whether that seg-
ment has been taken in its entirely by the moratoria.  Of course, defining the
property interest taken in terms of the very regulation being challenged is
circular . . . . Petitioners’ “conceptual severance” argument is unavailing be-
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altogether.  Under Lingle, the question is not: “what type of case is
this—a total-deprivation case or some other kind?”  Instead, the
question is “what quality of injury has been shown here?”  Owners,
in theory, will be pushed to frame their claims in terms of whether
the regulation in question burdens them in a particularly heavy
way, a way not shared by other citizens.  This reframing invites ju-
dicial elaboration of the distribution question that the Court has
now put at the center of takings inquiries.
Of course, the Lingle Court did not provide much guidance on
how to resolve the newly-reformulated claims.  Indeed, it could be
argued that by returning to Armstrong’s focus on the distribution
of burdens, the Court just restated the takings problem, without
even gesturing toward a determinate solution.  The Court tells us
that in regulatory takings cases it will focus on the “magnitude” of
the harm a regulation imposes.183  But how will it measure “magni-
tude”?  The same questions can be raised with respect to the issue
of “distribution.”184  All regulations will affect some people more
than others.  How can we determine how much inequality is tolera-
ble?  Inquiries into “magnitude” and “distribution” will not answer
the question of whether a regulation goes “too far” if they just re-
state the “too far” concept in different words.
There may, however, be advantages to the Court’s strategy of
redirecting the analysis back to distributional questions without
providing a fixed method or yet another new “test” for evaluating
or resolving those questions.  To understand why, it is useful to re-
turn to Mahon.185  The “too far” idea set forth in the Court’s opin-
ion was coupled with another, equally powerful, and almost equally
famous, observation; in Holmes’s words, “[g]overnment hardly
could go on if to some extent values incident to property could not
be diminished without paying for every such change in the general
law.”186  As has long been noted, these two observations—that
sometimes government must be allowed to regulate without having
to pay compensation, but that sometimes its regulatory actions can
impose disproportionate and unreasonable burdens—implicate a
cause it ignores Penn Central’s admonition that in regulatory takings cases
we must focus on “the parcel as a whole.”
Id.
183. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 542 (2005).
184. Id.
185. Penn. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
186. Id. at 413.
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deep tension.  The very regulations that produce social goods can
impose hugely inefficient demoralization costs on individuals.187
These demoralization costs are an important part of what under-
lies Americans’ concerns about the Takings Clause.  It is not obvi-
ous why the value of property owned by one person or group
should be reduced by regulation designed to increase the value of
property owned by others; affected property owners legitimately
ask, “Why me?”  The “Why me?” question takes on particular va-
lence because protection of property is widely understood to be an
integral part of constitutional law, and Americans have strong ex-
pectations about what the Constitution demands with respect to
property rights.188  Because “Americans form convictions about
constitutional meaning that have roots in constitutional history and
memory” and “[a]rguments about the nature of the Constitution
serve as a medium in which Americans, both in government and in
mobilized social movements, debate questions of national identity
and purpose,”189 when the Court interprets the Constitution, it is
“in constant dialogue with ambient political culture.”190  It is im-
portant, therefore, that its opinions engage public views of prop-
erty and reflect an openness to change in response to those
views.191  An opinion which, like Lingle, points to the difficult sub-
187. Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical
Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1214 (1967) (defin-
ing demoralization costs as “the total of (1) the dollar value necessary to offset disutil-
ities which accrue to losers and their sympathizers specifically from the realization
that no compensation is offered, and (2) the present capitalized dollar value of lost
future production (reflecting either impaired incentives or social unrest) caused by
demoralization of uncompensated losers, their sympathizers, and other observers dis-
turbed by the thought that they themselves may be subjected to similar treatment on
some other occasion”).
188. See Underkuffler, supra note 115, at 731 (describing the notion that “property
protects the individual’s interests from collective powers” as a view “in which all of us,
on some level, believe”); see also Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Legislative Consti-
tutionalism and Section Five Power: Policentric Interpretation of the Family and Medi-
cal Leave Act, 112 YALE L.J. 1943, 2022 (2003) (“Any historian or political scientist
will tell you that the Constitution lives a vibrant and consequential life outside the
courts . . . . The ‘Constitution’ which thrives in American culture, which is a crucible
for national values and commitments . . . is assuredly not merely what courts say it
is.”).
189. Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Protecting the Constitution from the People:
Juricentric Restrictions on Section Five Power, 78 IND. L.J. 1, 24 (2003) (exploring and
questioning the idea that the Supreme Court has the exclusive authority to interpret
the Constitution).
190. Id. at 25.
191. See Post, supra note 14, at 11 (“The Court must maintain the distinctly legal
authority of constitutional law, and yet it must also embed constitutional law within
the beliefs and values of nonjudicial actors.”).
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stantive fairness question at the heart of the Takings Clause, with-
out reducing it to a series of factors or tests, has the potential to
further the ongoing dialogue about property that is an important
part of our constitutional culture.
The dialogue has many potential dimensions—the tension be-
tween social goods and demoralization costs is mirrored by other
deep tensions lurking in takings law.  American discourse about
property is divided on many fronts and in many ways.  One tradi-
tion in American property theory embraces a “proacquisitive” po-
sition, under which stability of expectations is paramount and
regulatory redistributions are unacceptable,192 while another
adopts a “civic” position, which has far fewer problems with such
redistributions.193  Models of property that portray ownership in
terms of “a lord in a castle” or “an investor in a market economy”
compete with a model that “starts from the idea that owners have
obligations as well as rights.”194  The models lead to dramatically
different views of when takings should be deemed to have oc-
curred.195  “Conservative” visions of property, emphasizing individ-
ual rights, compete with “progressive” visions, emphasizing social
interdependence; under the former, categorical rules for takings
seem vastly more appropriate, while under the latter, it seems ap-
propriate to evaluate takings claims by assessing a broad range of
factors.196
These divisions about property are matched by divisions over the
nature of government.  If government is dominated by representa-
tives of the many and apt to exploit individuals, then takings law
exists to protect “us” from a dangerous “them,” but if we think of
192. Rose, Mahon Reconstructed, supra note 106, at 594 (“The proacquisitive posi-
tion is that individuals should be able to act on numerous fixed property expectations,
and thus any involuntary and uncompensated disruption of those expectations is a
wrongful taking.”).
193. Id. at 592 (“The civic property tradition is significant . . . in that its argument
for protection of property focused not on accumulating wealth, but rather on main-
taining the liberty of a self-governing nation.  The implication of this view is that
property is to be protected only up to the bounds of some conception of civil and
social responsibility.”).
194. Joseph William Singer, The Ownership Society and Takings of Property:
Castles, Investments, and Just Obligations, 30 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 309, 314 (2006)
(arguing that Penn Central’s return to a fairness and justice focus strikes the best
balance between government and individual rights).
195. Id. at 325-28.
196. See generally Underkuffler, supra note 115; see Radin, supra note 96, at 1668-
85 (contrasting a “neoconservative” view of property and its associated “conceptual-
ist” approach to takings questions with alternative views requiring “pragmatism” in
evaluating takings claims).
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our government as “us,” then “its disappointment of our hopes for
profit from time to time” is properly understood “as an acceptable
responsibility of citizenship.”197  If local regulators are seen as “em-
powered, possessing enormous leverage over private landown-
ers . . . [and] enjoying virtual monopoly power over land use
entitlements,” then the Takings Clause will be regarded as a neces-
sary bulwark against irresponsible power, a bulwark best actualized
by clear and simple per se rules, while “those who hold a more
benign view of government land-use regulators find less need for
categories of per se takings and fixed definitions of property.”198
Protecting property rights is one of government’s important pur-
poses, but government defines—and thus can define away—the
very property rights it is supposed to protect.199
It is in the context of these debates—and I have only scratched
the surface of takings literature in enumerating them200—that the
Court’s lack of precision is best understood.  We cannot hope and
197. Radin, supra note 96, at 1693.  Radin explains:
A “liberal” understanding of politics would lead us to the conclusion that the
risks associated with governmental interaction with us and our holdings are
different in principle [from other risks that investors face] because they raise
the possibility of systematic exploitation of the few by the representatives of
the many.  A “republican” understanding of politics perhaps does not move
so quickly to the fear of systematic exploitation; instead, its central concern
is preservation of self-government.  Thus, a “liberal” understanding of the
taking issue suggests that we evaluate takings claims by asking: Is this action
a likely instance of overreaching by Leviathan?  Whereas a republican un-
derstanding of the taking issue suggests that we evaluate such claims by ask-
ing: Is this action such as will undermine our commitment to self-
government?
Id. at 1692-93.
198. Gregory S. Alexander, Takings, Narratives, and Power, 88 COLUM. L. REV.
1752, 1752 (1988).  Like Radin, Alexander’s analysis contrasts “republican” and “pub-
lic choice” theories of government. Id. at 1770.
199. Paul, supra note 108, at 1411 (“[H]ow can government simultaneously be re-
sponsible for establishing the property rights of the citizenry and also be entrusted not
to render its constituents helpless when conditions dictate defining property rights so
as to benefit public officialdom?”).
200. See, e.g., Eric R. Claeys, Takings, Regulations, and Natural Property Rights, 88
CORNELL L. REV. 1549 (2003) (reexamining federal regulatory-takings law in light of
a line of eminent-domain cases decided in American state courts during the nine-
teenth century—cases which made the distinction between regulations and invasions
of rights); Andrea L. Peterson, The Taking Clause: In Search of Underlying Principles
Part I—A Critique of Current Takings Clause Doctrine, 77 CAL. L. REV. 1299 (1989)
(analyzing the development of takings law in an effort to construct a set of principles
that would account for the results in the great majority of the Court’s takings deci-
sions); William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause
and the Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782 (1995) (asserting that the limited
scope of the Takings Clause reflects the fact that members of the framing generation
believed that physical possession of property was particularly vulnerable to process
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should not wish that the Court in one moment might seek to re-
solve all the issues concerning property and government that un-
derlie the takings muddle.  We can hope and wish that the Court
will grapple with the issues with some transparency or clarity.  The
step away from sorting cases by type, along with a gesture back
toward the basic Armstrong concept of distributional fairness,
could lead the Court in this direction.  The competing values and
visions will not be made to go away, but they can be discussed.201
The openness of the discussion matters.  The flap following Kelo
and the ongoing strength of the various “property rights” move-
ments demonstrate that there is a deep and strong interest in the
questions of property and government—an interest shared by the
public as well as by academic theorists.  In Kelo, the Court’s well-
warranted sense that it was constrained by prior law effectively
precluded it from engaging in the charged but important debates
over what constitutes a “public use.”  But there is no such impedi-
ment in the regulatory takings arena.  As has long been lamented,
the cases dictate nearly nothing, and Penn Central balancing, which
the Court has now given primacy of place, is highly indetermi-
nate.202  The Court has a chance now to lead a visible debate about
the role of property in today’s highly regulated world.203
Nothing guarantees that it will actually do so, or that it will do so
effectively.  The reliance on the concentrated and onerous burdens
of physical appropriations as a paradigm in Lingle suggests that the
Court might have already committed itself to what has been called
a “physicalist” vision of property.204  Such a commitment would
take off the table many of the more important questions the Tak-
ings Clause raises about how property should be defined.205  The
Court could also decide that the larger issues of burden, magni-
tude, and distribution are subsumed in the Penn Central factors; it
failure and arguing that this should be acknowledged in the analysis of current takings
jurisprudence).
201. See Paul, supra note 108, at 1545 (suggesting that it would be a mistake for the
Court to try to articulate universal principles with respect to takings and that a better
approach would be to “directly focus disagreements on the competing values at stake
in takings controversies”).
202. See, e.g., Rose-Ackerman, supra note 126.
203. See OWEN FISS, THE LAW AS IT COULD BE 3 (2003) (“Adjudication is the
social process that enables judges to give meaning to public values.”); Post, supra note
14, at 11 (describing how particular opinions can serve as “an opening bid in a conver-
sation between the Court and the American public”).
204. See Paul, supra note 108, at 1404.
205. See generally Thomas W. Merrill, The Landscape of Constitutional Property, 86
VA. L. REV. 885 (2000) (describing differing definitions of property in constitutional
jurisprudence).
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could confine itself to elaborating and refining those factors, again
without adverting to the general issue of “fairness and justice.”  If
it does, Lingle will be remembered for its disentanglement of due
process from takings issues—and for nothing more.206
There is a chance, however, that something different might hap-
pen.  Courts confronting claims formulated in the “magnitude” and
“distribution” terms suggested by Lingle may ultimately have to
address openly some of the more vexing problems underlying regu-
latory takings law.  In resolving the “magnitude” question, for ex-
ample, courts will have to confront the issue of the “baseline”
against which the extent of the loss is to be evaluated.207  All regu-
lations will disrupt landowners’ expectations about the use of their
property, but is a landowner entitled to expect that her property
will be subject only to those regulations that existed when she ac-
quired it?208  In considering “distributional” concerns, how do we
define the relevant community?  Do we consider the benefits to the
claimant of the regulatory scheme in question—or even of other
regulatory schemes—or only the burdens?209
Each of these individual questions implicates the larger ques-
tions enumerated earlier concerning the connection between prop-
erty and the state.210  They provide a way to contextualize, and
potentially render less strident, the oversimplified claims of “prop-
erty rights” adherents who see a taking in every penny lost to regu-
206. For arguments that this disentangling is itself important, see generally D. Ben-
jamin Barros, At Last, Some Clarity: The Potential Long-Term Impact of Lingle v.
Chevron and the Separation of Takings and Substantive Due Process, 69 ALB. L. REV.
343 (2005); Robert G. Dreher, Lingle’s Legacy: Untangling Substantive Due Process
from Takings Doctrine, 30 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 371 (2006).
207. See Torres, Taking and Giving, supra note 28, at 3.  Gerald Torres writes:
[T]he misnamed property rights revolution is predicated on an effort to
freeze in place the existing distribution of wealth.  One way to achieve this
goal is to define the existing distribution of rights and liabilities as part of the
total wealth held by individuals.  Thus, any regulation that rearranges the
distribution of rights and liabilities can be understood as a redistribution of
wealth.
Id.
208. See Rose, Property and Expropriation, supra note 107, at 19-22 (describing
regulatory takings problems in terms of the disruptions of transitions); see also Sterk,
supra note 92, at 206 (“The Takings Clause protects primarily against change in back-
ground state law.  As a result, the constitutional protection available to a landowner
depends heavily on background principles of state law in effect before the challenged
regulation was enacted.  A regulation that constitutes an unconstitutional taking in
Houston could pass constitutional muster if enacted in New York.”).
209. See Torres, Taking and Giving, supra note 28, at 18 (asserting that a principal
problem in measuring the reduction in value of property concerns whether “we need
to account for the value attributable to public action”).
210. See supra text accompanying notes 197-99.
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latory intervention.  But resolving these questions could keep the
courts—and, at the end of the line, the Supreme Court—in produc-
tive dialogue about our constitutional culture of property.  Because
people care about property, this is a dialogue to which they are
likely to attend.  Its possibility is the promise of Lingle.
III. IMPLICATIONS
What will all of this mean for local governments?  Both Kelo and
Lingle clarify, to some extent, the rules courts will apply in subse-
quent takings cases litigated in federal courts. Kelo clearly estab-
lishes that, for federal constitutional purposes, “public use” will be
defined in broadly deferential terms; Lingle clearly establishes that
regulations will not have to pass Agins’s onerous “substantially ad-
vances” test.
But these doctrinal clarifications may not take us very far.  As
we have already seen, Kelo spawned dozens of new statutes de-
signed to limit the ends for which governmental entities may take
property.  This post-Kelo legislation, and not federal law, is likely
to determine the scope of eminent domain power in the future.
The statutes, many of which were written in haste, seek, inter alia,
to constrain governments from using eminent domain power for
purposes of “economic redevelopment” or in the absence of
“blight.”  The vagueness of these new statutory terms seems likely
to lead to further litigation.211  On the regulatory takings side, the
elimination of Agins leaves us with Penn Central, never the clearest
standard, and with the new criteria of “magnitude” and “distribu-
tion,” whose meanings Lingle left radically underspecified.  In the
end, there is much left to litigate in the takings arena.
Outside the sphere of doctrine, some of the more interesting im-
plications of Kelo and Lingle turn on how those decisions are un-
derstood by nonjudicial actors, especially the public at large.  As
we have seen, Kelo’s facts were accessible and sympathetic—even
heart-rending, as they were portrayed in the media—and the out-
come was widely reported.   What people know specifically about
Kelo is primarily limited to its result,212 i.e., a holding in favor of
211. See, e.g., Mahoney, supra note 94, at 127 (“‘Economic development’ is not a
self-executing concept, but one that will require substantial judicial interpretation.”).
212. See Barry Friedman, Mediated Popular Constitutionalism, 101 MICH. L. REV.
2596, 2631-32 (2003) (considering the ways in which the public gets information about
the Court and asserting that “the public cannot possibly follow the actual content of
opinions, and largely knows about opinions simply what the media or opinion leaders
tell them”).
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the government and against the homeowner plaintiffs.  Accord-
ingly, it is not unreasonable to surmise that the case served to
heighten public suspicion—and scrutiny—of exercises of eminent
domain.  The legislative and political backlash against Kelo demon-
strates how a legal victory can work against the prevailing party.
However broad local governments’ eminent domain powers may
be in theory at this legal juncture, their ability to exercise those
powers in the current political climate may be quite limited as a
practical matter.
Of course, again speaking theoretically, what local governments
cannot do through eminent domain they may be able to accomplish
using alternative means, such as regulation or taxation.213  It is pos-
sible that greater public attention to eminent domain will channel
local governments towards these alternative legal strategies.  This
re-channeling, arguably, will result in less protection to ownership
rights, if these alternative land use controls are either less visible or
more difficult to contest.214  But given the resurgence of “property
rights” movements and the distrust provoked by Kelo, it is not
clear that the public will actually pay less attention to, or be less
apt to challenge, government power asserted as regulation or
taxation.
Thus, it is possible that what we may see in the wake of Kelo and
Lingle is yet more litigation testing the scope of local governmental
power over property uses.  In this litigation, courts will need to
confront squarely one influential public understanding of property
rights, an understanding that largely underwrites the “property
rights” movements and that is an important part of the resistance
to Kelo.215  This understanding envisions property as a domain of
freedom—freedom to act as owners choose, freedom from regula-
tions limiting owners’ liberty to so act.216  This view regards most
213. Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 4, at 1416, 1426.
214. Bell & Parchomovsky argue that they are. See id. at 1426-33.
215. But this is only one important part of the resistance to Kelo.  Another impor-
tant part is the sense that Kelo is bad for the poor. See Kelo v. City of New London,
545 U.S. 469, 521 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“Allowing the government to take prop-
erty solely for public purposes is bad enough, but extending the concept of public
purpose to encompass any economically beneficial goal guarantees that these losses
will fall disproportionately on poor communities.”); see generally Dana, supra note 94
(discussing the negative effects that post-Kelo legislation has had on the poor).
216. See, e.g., Kanner, supra note 4, at 229 (“[I]t is difficult to see why only in the
abuse-prone field of eminent domain, unoffending individuals should be subjected to
de facto, unreviewable exercise of government power that strikes them where they
are most vulnerable: their homes, which are supposed to be, and are, recognized by
law, policy, and custom as their places of security and repose.”).  Joseph Singer has
dubbed this understanding the “ownership model.” See SINGER, supra note 98, at 2-3.
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exercises of eminent domain as fundamentally misguided because,
as this view holds, government’s role is to protect individuals’ prop-
erty rights, not to interfere with them.  Regulations similarly are
suspect in this view, since they limit owners’ freedoms rather than
enhance them.  While academics have challenged this vision for
some time,217 there is no doubting its rhetorical power or political
popularity.218  What happens next in the takings arena will depend
a great deal on the success with which both courts and local legisla-
tive bodies engage this understanding.
From the point of view of constitutional culture, this engagement
is part of an ongoing negotiation between citizens and government
over what property will mean in our national culture.  This negotia-
tion is possible because “the Constitution is a very special kind of
law,”219 one that symbolizes our national commitments.220  Thus,
“[a]rguments about the nature of the Constitution serve as a me-
dium in which Americans, both in government and in mobilized
social movements, debate questions of national identity and pur-
pose.”221  Because property is widely understood to be part of our
identity as Americans, much is at stake in the litigation that is
likely to follow in the wake of Kelo and Lingle.
While we cannot know whether this litigation will fulfill the
promise of Lingle, we do know that people care about property,
and that is no less true on the local level than on the national level.
Indeed, the constitutional culture of property may have its strong-
est valence at the local level, for it is there—in the homes and
neighborhoods where people live and work—that the abstractions
of property and government are experienced.  Fancy, innovative
Joan Williams has called it the “intuitive image.” See Joan Williams, The Rhetoric of
Property, 83 IOWA L. REV. 277, 289-95 (1998); see also Carol M. Rose, Canons of
Property Talk, or, Blackstone’s Anxiety, 108 YALE L.J. 601, 604 (1998) (describing the
“exclusivity axiom”).
217. See, e.g., SINGER, supra note 98, at 71 (“[P]roperty rights are themselves forms
of regulation.”); Rose, Evolutionary Approach, supra note 126, at 593 (“A private
property regime, after all, is a form of regulatory regime . . . . We are not choosing
property or regulation; we are choosing among regulatory regimes on property, and
we are choosing regulatory regimes at least in part to induce people to respond with
actions that accomplish the things to which we aspire in our larger common life.”).
These critiques notwithstanding, this view of property is held by highly influential
legal thinkers, most notably Richard Epstein. See EPSTEIN, supra note 16, at 3-6.
218. See Underkuffler, supra note 115, at 731 (describing near-universal belief in
the view that the Takings Clause’s “essential function” is to protect individual inter-
ests from collective power).
219. Post & Siegel, supra note 189, at 24.
220. Id. at 25.
221. Id. at 24.
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regulatory schemes are scrutinized through a simple but charged
grid in which people often regard what they own, at any given mo-
ment in time, as an absolute entitlement that government must
protect—and cannot alter—without regard to the social benefits
that regulation might produce.  That grid may be simplistic, naı¨ve,
or otherwise misguided, but it is nonetheless powerful. Kelo and
Lingle teach municipalities that they ignore that grid at their peril.
Like the Supreme Court, local governments must expressly engage
with cultural understandings of property if they are to attain legiti-
macy in the eyes of their constituents.
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